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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW
HENRY J. Fox*
Before considering some of the recent criminal law cases which
are significant as indices of the present course of criminal law, let
us briefly review some of the major inherent difficulties attending
the administration of criminal law. The degree of efficiency that
can be attained in enforcing rules governing human conduct is
intimately associated with the extent to which such precepts lend
themselves to enforcement.' It is virtually inevitable that when-
ever society burdens the law with an extensive program of regula-
tion of many phases of conduct whose very nature does not permit
of simple objective treatment there will follow loud complaints of
the breakdown of the traditional enforcing agencies. The problem
of enforcing the criminal law is in reality a problem of the intrinsic
limitations upon effective legal action.
Crime is a relative concept, varying both with the society in
which it is prohibited and the time at which it is prohibited.' To
the fact that the evolution of the criminal law lacked scientific
guidance we may ascribe the great number of vestigial penal laws,
both substantive and adjective, which so frequently mire the en-
forcing agencies. Often, strict compliance with the technical re-
quirements of criminal procedure stemmed from the endeavor of
the courts to ameliorate the excessive severity of the punishments
for the old common law crimes. Our modern criminal codes are
not unified by a single consistent underlying concept but rather
consist of a mixture of principles derived from diverse schools of
philosophy. 'Each generation has accepted the criminal law as it
was bequeathed by its fathers, rarely troubling to examine its heri-
tage for the purpose of culling out those portions which were based
upon outmoded theories. Each generation has sought to build upon
the foundation of the old criminal laws regardless of whether or
not the foundation could accommodate the structure. This accounts
* National Labor Relations Board.
See Pound, Limits of Effective Legal Action (1917) 3 Journal of American
Bar Association 55; Cohen, Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law
(1927) 27 Columbia Law Reviiw 237.
2 Glueck, Causes of Crime, Mercury, August, 1933, 430, 435.
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for the contradictions, the result of conflicts and compromises be-
tween irreconcilable penal theories, so frequently encountered in
our criminal codes.
The comparative inertia of the procedural criminal law during
a time which has witnessed great changes in society as a whole is
undoubtedly one of the important causes for the growing dissatis-
faction with the administration of the criminal law.3  The legis-
latures have sought to improve the situation by various devices
and, in fact, have effected some improvements. For example, wit-
ness the growing number of penal statutes which create presump-
tions of guilt and place the burden of proof on the defendant. The
great procedural advantages which the state derives from such aids,
and the difficulty of enforcing many statutes without such assistance,
have led many states to adopt this device.4
The development of the substantive criminal law which for
several generations has been for the most part by virtue of legis-
lative enactment has been profoundly affected by two main forces.
One has called for an increase of the area of conduct regulated by
penal sanctions. to cope with new problems raised by changes in
the social and economic milieu of the country since the Civil War,
and to enforce by legislation the increasingly high standards of busi-
ness morality which were coming to be generally accepted. The
other force has sought to achieve more efficient law enforcement by
altering the common law pattern of act and intent to permit greater
ease in conviction and thus compensate for defects in procedure
and to a much larger extent in personnel and modes of penal treat-
ment.."
Many of the cases which have been selected for discussion in
this article may not seem unusual nor express a startling new
postulate but they are included because the statute involved or the
court's reasoning in arriving at its decision illustrates the trend of
the criminal law. The importance of a case was evaluated in terms-
of relative progress from, or retrogression to, the old concepts of
3 Warner and Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During
the Past Fifty Years (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 583, 585-6. This article and its com-
panion article by Hall on The Substantive Law of Crimes-1887-1936 (1937) 50
Harv. L. Rev. 616, are invaluable in tracing the trends of the criminal law in the
United States over the period of 1887-1936. See Howard, American Criminal Jus-
tice and the Rules of the Game (1938), XXIV American Bar Association Journal
347 in which the author properly stresses the important role the quality of the
administrative personnel plays in the administration of criminal justice.
4Hall, op. cit. at 648. The New York penal code has at least forty instances
where the burden of proof is imposed upon the defendant.
5 Ibid. at 618.
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the criminal law. The limitation of space, of course, merely permits
an adumbration of the more important of these processes.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Extension of Province of Criminal Law
Many factors have combined to create a tremendous expansion
of the area of human conduct regulated by the criminal law. It has
been burdened with tasks formerly borne by such agencies as the
church, public opinion and the family unit itself in the relatively
uncomplicated polity of the nineteenth century. If, to the decrease
of the ability 6f these traditional institutions to cope with modern
social problems, is added the increase of many new conflicts in social
interests and ingenious modes of infringing recognized rights cre-
ated by modern inventions and by the vast increase of urbanized
population, the effort to solve the problem by an appeal to the
criminal law is readily understood. This, then, accounts for myriad
regulations of trades7 , occupations, monopolies,8 banking and
finance,9 sale of securities,10 foods," drugs,12 liquor, 3 and the use of
automobiles, 4 a legion of rules usually scattered throughout the
statutes rather than incorporated in the criminal codes.
The courts, however, have not neglected to preserve the sacred
personal rights of individuals whenever the legislatures have over-
stepped their proper scope of regulation. In Dirk De Jonge v. State
GPeople v. Menagas, 367 Ill. 330, 11 N. E. (2d) 403 (1937). In an indictment
for larceny of 70,601 kilowatt hours of electric current, one of the defendant's
contentions which was upheld by the trial court, was that electric current was
not a proper subject of larceny because electrons are the only elements of elec-
tricity which are matter, and since none of the electrons were consumed but were
returned to the generator, there was nothing charged to have been stolen which
could be made the subject of larceny. The appellate court rejected this afgument
on the theory that the larceny statute doesn't distinguish between tangible and
intangible property. The modem test in this type of case seems to be that
whether a particular thing can be the subject of larceny does not depend on
whether it is corporeal or uncorporeal, but whether it is capable of being appro-
priated by a person other than the owner.
7See Robinson Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 692, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 19,
1936).
8 See 15 U. S. C. sec. 26 (1934).
9 See Schroeder v. State, 210 Wis. 366, 244 N. W. 599 (1933).
10 See Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U. S. C. sec. 78a (1934) and
The Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 79
(Supp. 1936).
" See 21 U. S. C. sec. 71 (1934).
12 See 21 U. S. C. sees. 171-74 (1934).
13 See 49 Stat. 877 (1935), 27 U. S. C. A. sec. 122 (Supp. 1936).
14 An instance of the regulation of the use of the automobile is involved in
People v. Rauch, County Court of Queens County, N. Y. (1937); Note (1937) 5
Univ. of Chi. Law Rev. 142, appeal decided in 299 N. Y. S. 155.
802 HENRY J. FOX
of Oregon15 the court, in holding that participation in a lawful public
meeting cannot be punished merely because it was held under the
auspices of the Communist Party,"6 said:
"Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which
are safeguarded by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the Constitution. . . . These rights may be abused by using speech
or press . . . in order to incite violence and crime. The people through
their legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse .... The
rights themselves may not be curtailed."
In Thomas v. District of Columbia'7 the appellate court refused
to tolerate arbitrary and dictatorial methods employed by a trial
judge. In this case informations were filed against the defendants
charging them with littering streets with handbills in violation of
police regulation. The leaflets contained communistic propaganda,
but there was evidence that they were not thrown or dropped on
the street in violation of regulation. The court refused to permit
counsel to call witnesses and to allow defendants to testify but
decided the case while one of the defendants was still on the stand.
The appellate court granted the defendants a new trial. "Due process
means a law which hears before it condemns." The provision of
the Cofistitution guaranteeing to defendants in criminal cases the
assistance of counsel means "effective assistance" which was denied
by Lhe court's refusal to allow testimony of witnesses and its denial
of the right to argue the case.' 8
In Johnson v. Zerbst, Warden, etc.19 the United States Supreme
Court decided that unless the right to assistance by counsel guar-
anteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
is competently and intelligently waived by the accused, lack of
counsel constitutes a jurisdictional defect which will render the
judgment void and entitle the prisoner to obtain his release by a
writ of habeas corpus.20
15 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937).
16 Oregon Code, 1930, secs. 14-3110-3112--as amended by chapter 459, Oregon
Laws, 1933 (The Criminal Syndicalism Statute).
7 90 F. (2d) 424 (1937).
is See Norris v. Ala., 294. U. S. 587 (1935) where the court held that the ex-
clusion of all negroes from a grand jury by which a negro is indicted, or from
a petit jury by which he is tried, resulting from systematic and arbitrary exclusion
of negroes from the jury lists solely because of their race or color, is a denial
of the equal protection of laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See
also Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600 (1935).
'9 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938).
20 The court pointed out, however, that the burden of proof on such habeas
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B. Expansion of Social Responsibility
Illustrative of an important trend is the statute involved in
People v. Rauch.2' The defendant, aware of the defective condition
of the brakes on his automobile, loaned it to another who was also
cognizant of the deficiency. While using the car in the commission
of his own business, the borrower, due to the faulty brakeg, struck
the deceased and fatally injured her. The trial court held both the
driver and the defendant guilty of second degree manslaughter.
Here is an instance of the increase of social responsibility which
has found expression in the criminal.law. 22 The net result of the
changes in these crimes in automobile offenses has been additional
emphasis upon negligence. Liability is now apportioned to the
degree of risk to life and limb created, rather than to the moral
delinquencies of the defendant. The crimes of murder, manslaughter,
and assault and battery are being used in the attempt to control
the reckless use of dangerous instrumentalities, which modern in-
ventions have entrusted to reckless or unskilled hands, in addition
to their traditional function of punishing intended- consequences.
23
The case of People v. Hoffman24 defines the limit of criminal liability
in situations where negligence has been substituted for real intent
as the essence of the offense. The defendant here was convicted
by the trial court of second degree manslaughter 25 for negligently
causing a dwelling to burn and then fleeing without warning the
corpus proceedings rests upon the prisoner to establish that he did not waive
his right to counsel.
See Jones v. Commonwealth, 97 F. (2d) 335 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) where the
federal circuit court'in granting the prisoner's release on a writ of habeas corpus
said, "The judicial process of the State have been here vainly invoked ....
The appellant is not to be sacrificed upon the altar of a formal legalism too liter-
ally applied when those who from the beginning sought his life in effect confess
error, when impairment of constitutional right may be perceived, and the door
to clemency is closed."
21 County Court of Queen's County, N. Y. (1937). Upon the appeal the de-
cision was reversed because the record failed to show that there was a causal
connection between the defective brakes and the occurrence of the casualty.
299 N. Y. Supp. 155 (1937).
22 See the case of Commonwealth v. Stelma, 327 Pa. 317, 192 AtI. 906 (1937)
where the loose language of the court might conceivably be construed to mean
that under a statute defining first degree murder as a homicide occurring while
the defendant was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a robbery, it is im-
material whether the intention to steal was conceived before the blows which
caused the death. Criticized in Note (1938) XUI Dickinson Law Rev. 85.
23 Hall, op. cit. at 642.
24 162 Misc. 677, 294 N. Y. Supp. 444 (1937): Note (1937) 12 St. John's L. Rev.
138.
25 N. Y. Penal Laws, sec. 105 : "Such homicide is manslaughter in the second
degree, when committed without a design to effect death: 3. By any act, procure-
ment or culpable negligence of any person . . ."
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other occupants, one of whom suffered death as a result of the fire.
The appellate court held that culpable negligence requisite for
criminal conviction is somethinig more than the slight negligence
necessary to support a civil action for damages.
Although it is the weight of authority that criminal liability
is not coextensive with tort liability,26 the courts have always found
it difficult to distinguish between the various degrees of negligence
and there is no accurate standard which cleaves a distinct line be-
tween civil and criminal negligence. It is doubtful whether a statute
attempting to clarify the difference would aid materially since each
case presents a different fact situation.27
C. Judicial Interpretation of Penal Statute
With the assumption of responsibility of the legislature for
changes in the criminal law, the judge's attitude toward penal
statutes possessing flexible standards is extremely important. Under
the guise of ascertaining "legislative intent" the court, if it is so
inclined, may actually vitiate the statute. There has been a rather
wide recognition that the common law rule of strict construction of
penal statutes has no proper general application today,28 although
it is still valuable in a few specific instances. 9 Even in the absence
of statutes abolishing the rule of strict construction"° courts will
usually enforce the fair implications of a penal statute.
In United States v. Giles3t the couirt held that the statute32
reading: "Any officer, director, agent, or employee of any Federal
reserve bank, of any member bank. . . w7ho makes any false entry
... with intent to injure or defraud... shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor . . ." could be interpreted so as to include the accused,
although- he did not personally write any false entries. The court,
in refusing to give the narrow meaning to the statute which the
defendant claimed, said: "To hold that it applies only when the
accused personally writes the false entry or affirmatively directs
26 People v. Angelo, 246 N. Y. 451, 159 N. E. 394 (1927); see Note (1936) 25 Calif.
L. Rev. 18 (1936) and Note (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 717.
27 See Note (1937) 6 Fordham L. Rev. 309, n. 3.
28 But see State v. O'Donnell, 191 Wash. 511, 71 P. (2d) 571 (1937); Note (1938)
36 Mich. L. Rev. 842.
29 Hall, op. cit. at 637.
30 Hall, op. cit. at 637, n. 114.
21 57 S. Ct. 340 (1937), 300 U. S. 41.
32 Sec. 5209, R. S., as amended by Act Sept. 26, 1918, c. 177, sec. 7, 40 Stat. 967,
972, 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 592.
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another to do so would emasculate the statute-defeat the very
end in view. '33
Another liberal interpretation of a statute and one of sig-
nificance to communities which seek to outlaw pin-ball machines
and other gambling devices is City of Milwaukee v. Burns.34  The
city ordinance prohibited the possession of any device "... upon,
in, by or through which money is or may be played or paid upon
chance, or upon the result of the action of such .... device, money
or other valuable thing is or may be stpked, bet, hazarded, won
or lost." The case was tried on the theory that the guilt of the
defendant depended upon whether or not the defendant had ac-
cepted a token won on the machine in payment for a glass of beer.
The Supreme Court held:
"Whether he redeemed the chips which the machine gave out either
in cash or any form of merchandise is wholly immaterial. In the first
instance, the person playing the machine had to insert a nickel for which
he received ten balls. If upon playing the balls, he should happen
to win, he received one or more chips which could be used to play the
machine further in place of nickels, so that in playing the machine, the
chips had a value which would constitute it a gambling device."
The breadth of this decision obviously will thwart those who comply
with the letter of the statute while evading its spirit.35
The general language of the statute involved in the case of
33 See Johnson v. United States, 89 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937). See People
v. Herbert, 162 Misc. 817, 295 N. Y. S. 251 (1937) where thp defendants, officers
of an unincorporated labor union, indicted for embezzlement under sec. 1290 of
the N. Y. Penal Law, demurred to the indictment on the ground that they were
joint owners of the fund, analogous to the status of partners. The court over-
ruled the demurrer on the ground that a reasonable construction of "association"
in the statute would include an unincorporated labor union. See Note (1938)
7 Brooklyn Law Rev. 102. In Bussort v. State, 128 Fla. 891, 176 So. 32 (1937), al-
though the Florida statute distinguished between larceny and obtaining money
under false pretenses and the complaining witness voluntarily delivered both
title and possession to the defendants, nevertheless the court found the defendants
guilty of larceny. Criticized in Note (1938) 23 Cornell Law Rev. 488. Cf. State v.
Whitehurst, 212 N. C. 300, 193 S. E. 657 (1937) where the court held that the re-
ceiver of an insolvent corporation was not included within the purview of the
embezzlement statute and that it would exclude from the operation of the statute
everything which did not clearly come within the scope of the meaning. See
Note (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rev. 174.
34 225 Wis. 296, 274 N. W. 273 (1937). See Work of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, 1938 Wis. L. Rev. 43, 64.
35 See State v. Clementi, 224 Wis. 145, 272 N. W. 29 (1937), which involved the
larceny of a slot machine. The court logically held that even though it was con-
traband it could be the subject of larceny, and that the state was not seeking
to recover the property or its value, but rather to punish the defendants for
-violating its criminal laws. Contra: People v. Caridis, 29 Calif. App. 166, 154
Pac. 1061 (1915); People v. Spencer, 54 Calif. App. 54, 201 Pac. 130 (1921). See
Note (1937) 21 Marq. L. Rev. 221; Palmer, Bank Nights: Are They Lotteries? (1937)
XII St. John's L. Rev. 22.
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City of Milwaukee v. Burns36 calls attention to problems of general
legislation designed to regulate situations or conduct whose very
nature makes it impractical to enumerate or to define accurately.37
The outstanding example of these flexible laws are those regulating
the use of automobiles where statutes provide such variable stand-
ards as "reasonable care," and "driving so unreasonably as to en-
danger persons or property." Although some jurisdictions have.
held such statutes invalid because too indefinite,38 the majority of
jurisdictions have accepted the flexible standard as a matter of
practical necessity.39 A study of the cases seems to justify the con-
clusion that a fairly liberal court will uphold a statute which en-
deavors to regulate a subject intrinsically incapable of specific defi-
nition or enumeration if that statute is as definite as is compatible
with the nature of the subject regulated 40 If, howevei, the statute
is too indefinite, it will be declared unconstitutional.41
PROCEDURAL LAW
The trial is highly important because it is the instrument which
seeks to segregate the guilty from the innocent and because it is
the most convenient place at which the public can observe the
criminal law in action. Not only is it the major source of news-
paper copy dealing with criminal law, but many people base their
opinion of criminal justice solely on their experience in the court
room as juror, witness, spectator or defendant. Further, where
trials are prompt, fair and accurate, it constitutes a stimulus to
the police and other agencies engaged in the execution of the
various phases of the criminal law.4 2
A. Apprehension
(a) Search and Seizure
As the gradual adjustment of severity of penalties to the com-
38 Supra note 32.
37 For example, sec. 48 of the Uniform Traffic Act of 1911, Ill.
38 State v. Lantz, 90 W. Va. 738, 111 S. E. 766 (1922); Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App.
371, 75 S. E. 523 (1912).
39 Freund, Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes (1921) 30 Yale L. J. 437, 443-444;
Hall, op. cit. at 636. See Nutting, Definitive Standards in Federal Obscenity Leg-
islation (1938) 23 Iowa Law Rev. 24.
40 Mulkern v. State, 176 Wis. 490, 187 N. W. 190 (1922).
41 State v. Parker, 183 Minn. 588, 237 N. W. 409 (1931); Connally, Commissioner
et al v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926). As to effect of requirement
of unlawful intent see Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343 (1918); Hygrade
Provision Co., Inc. et al v. Sherman, Attorney Gen. of New York, et al, 266 U. S.
497 (1925).
4 2 Warner. op. cit. at 592.
CRIMINAL LAW
munity concept of fairness developed and the number of defendant's
safeguards increased, the frequent utilization of technicalities by
judges in order to protect defendants from punishments which were
unduly harsh in proportion to their offense has diminished. The
practice of the courts, however, to nullify unpopular laws or dis-
courage undesirable methods of executing laws is still palpably
extant.
4 3
In United States v. Kaplan" officers, after having received com-
plaints, approached the defendant's dwelling and smelled fermenting
mash emanating from the building. Upon this evidence they arrested
the defendant's wife and searched the premises without a warrant
and found an illicit Still. The court decided that the search was
so unreasonable as to invalidate the defendant's conviction for
unlawful distilling. The court said: "Nobody questioned that the
officers in fact did smell the whiskey; but that did not alone strip




The trend of'the cases relating to the extradition of fugitives
indicates a greater readiness on the part of the courts to surrender
the accused to the requisitioning state. In People ex rel Biggs et al
v. Nash4 the court held that the affidavits annexed to the requisition
were sufficient even though they were based only upon information
and belief.
4 7
43 Ibid. at 587-88. See Waite, Unreasonable Search (1937) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
623.
44 89 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
45 Case follows Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1, 52 Sup. Ct. 466 (1932) and
Re Phoenix Cereal Beverage Co., 58 F. (2d) 953 (1932). In United States v. Lee,
83 F. (2d) 195 (1936) the same court held expressly that there must be more
evidence than smell.
See Taylor v. State, Okla., 69 P. (2d) 489 (1937) where the officers searched
the defendant's home in his absence and failed to leave a copy of the warrant
attached to the door in compliance with the statutory provision: Held: unlawful
search and seizure.
Cf. with Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 290 (C. C. A. 3d 1937) where
officers suspected violation of the liquor law and stopped a truck smelling of
liquor and searched it and the premises from which it came without a warrant.
Held: there was probable cause for the search.
4- 366 Ill. 186, 8 N. E. (2d) 359 (1937).
47 See Ex Parte Rabinowitz; 61 Okla. Cr. 90, 65 P. (2d) 1236 (1937) where
the court held that in an extradition hearing the accused must show conclusively
that he was absent from the demanding state at the time of commission of the
crime. See Note (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 431.
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B. Trial Proceedings
(a) Indictment and Information
At the commencement of the century there occurred a general
movement by the state legislatures towards simplification of indict-
ments and the creation of short forms. In some instances the
statutes even obviate the necessity of specifying most of the his-
toric allegations4 8 and the defendant's only recourse is to apply for a
bill of particulars. In many states the prosecutor is permitted to
amend a faulty indictment.4 9 Consonant with thig policy, New York
passed a statute" permitting the state to consolidate in one indict-
ment crimes of a similar nature which are part of a common plan
or scheme. In People ex rel Pincus v. Adams 1 the validity of this
statute was challenged. The defendants were indicated on forty-nine
counts, each of which set forth a separate and distinct crime of
conspiracy to extort money, extortion, or attempted extortion. Most
of the alleged offenses were committed prior to the enactment of
the statute. The court held that the statute did not violate the
state constitutional provision requiring presentment by jury and
further, that the statute was not violative of Article I, section 10
of the United States Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto
laws.5 2
(b) Double Jeopardy
One of the most troublesome phases in the application of
criminal law is the determination of what constitutes double
jeopardy.5 3  In State v. Fredlund- the defendant was tried for
third degree manslaughter as a result of an automobile accident in
which A and B were killed. He was acquitted of the charge arising
out of the death of A. Subsequently at the trial for the death of B
48 N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 176.
49 Warner, op. cit. at 588.
50 Laws 1936, c. 328, sec. 1.
51274 N. Y. 447, 9 N. E. (2d) 46 (1937).
52 The defendant contended that it was an ex post facto law because he would
be allowed more peremptory challenges if tried separately for each offense.
See Gutenkunst v. State, 259 N. W. 610 (Wis., 1935).
But see People v. Green, 368 Ill. 242, 13 N. E. (2d) 278 (1938) where the court
held that the information was defective because it did not specifically cover the
acts with which the defendant was charged. See also Whittington v. State, 173
Md. 387, 196 AtI. 314 (1938) where the court reversed a conviction because the
indictment erroneously termed the offense a felony instead of a misdemeanor.
5" See American Law Institute, Proposed Final Draft, Double Jeopardy, March
18, 1935.
54 200 Minn. 44, 273 N. W. 353 (1937). See Note (1937) 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 140,
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he pleaded former jeopardy. The court held that since two separate
offenses resulted from the defendant's single act, he may be tried
for each offense.5 5 This decision seems to be a rather narrow view
since both deaths resulted from the same act and the only question
was whether the defendant's conduct brought him within the scope
of the criminal statute. This question had been answered by his
acquittal in the first case."" The court's analogy to the availability
of separate civil suits under the circumstances seems to indicate
that the court loses sight of the fact that it is the state which
is seeking redress.
A case dealing with the right of a court to dismiss a case
without prejudicing the rights of the state is State v. Whitman.5 7
Here, after the jury was impaneled and sworn and the state had
called its principal witness, the court objected to the conduct of
the defendant's attorney, discharged the jury, and set the trial
for the following day. The appellate court held that to try the
defendant again would place him in second jeopardy. After a jury
has been impaneled and sworn it can be discharged only if there
is a breakdown in judicial machinery which renders further orderly
procedure impracticable, such as the illness of the couirt or a
juror."
The method of determining what constitutes second jeopardy
was presented in Short v. United States. 9 The defendants were
indicted under the federal act for a conspiracy to violate several
federal statutes. They pleaded former jeopardy. The second
indictment alleged different overt acts from the first, and the
violation of an additional statute as one of the objects of the con-
spiracy. Different persons were alleged as co-conspirators, and a
different place of conspiracy. The second indictment covered part
of the period included in the first one. The trial court denied the
65 Acc'd, People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N. E. (2d) 397 (1938). State v. Fred-
lund follows case of Commonwealth v. Browning, 146 Ky. 770, 143 S. W. 407 (1912).
See Grindstaff v. State, 172 Tenn. 77, 110 S. W. (2d) 309 (1937).
50 See State v. Akers, 106 Mont. 105, 76 P. (2d) 638 (1938), where the court
laid down the test that where several articles are taken at different places and
different times, there is but one larceny if the asportation of the several articles
were in fact one transaction. To constitute one transaction the several subjects
of the larceny must be so related in point of time and position as to make it
physically possible for actual control to be exercised over both at the same time.
57 93 Utah 557, 74 P. (2d) 696 (1938).
58 See Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Calif (2d) 350, 67 P. (2d) 384 (1937),
holding that a dismissal of a criminal case without the defendant's consent after
the jury has been impaneled and sworn is equivalent to an acquittal and is a bar
to a subsequent indictment for the same offense.
59 91 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937). See Note (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 925.
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plea and refused to submit the question to the jury. The defendants
appealed from a judgment of guilty. In reversing the judgment the
circuit court held that the question should have been submitted
to the jury since the alleged facts did not necessarily show dif-
ferent offenses from those charged in the first indictment. Under
the federal statute the gravamen of the offense is the agreement,
the conspiracy itself. To allow separate convictions for the same
agreement merely through allegation and proof of different overt
acts at each trial would clearly be double jeopardy. The true
criterion of double jeopardy is the number of injuries to the
state and in a prosecution for a conspiracy that would depend
upon the number of agreements. 0
The Short case is to be distinguished from Fleisher v. United
States,"' where the defendants were charged with a conspiracy by
an indictment specifying four counts, each of which alleged a con-
spiracy to violate a different law,62 namely, possessing unregistered
apparatus for distilling, making mash in an unregistered distillery,
carrying on distilling business unlawfully and possessing distilled
spirits in unstamped containers. The defendant was convicted on
each count and appealed on the ground that only one sentence may
be imposed because the four acts proved collectively constituted
only the single offense of unlawful distilling. The judgment was
affirmed on the theory that Congress specifically provided that
each act alleged in the separate counts constitutes a separate offense
and it is wholly constitutional for Congress to punish separately
each step leading to the consummation of the transaction which it
has power to forbid and to punish, also, the completed transaction.
In the Short case the government sought to prove the same con-
spiracy by different overt acts, while in the Fleisher case conspir-
acies to violate four distinct laws were proved.
(c) Admissible Evidence of Guilt.
The conflict between the desire to obtain more and easier con-
victions of offenders and the effort of the courts to force the ad-
ministrative officials to employ only ethical methods in prosecution
still exists, as evidenced by several recent decisions. Aside from
60 Note (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 925. See Palko v. State of Conn., a highly
significant case, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937) discussed infra under subject of appeals
by state.
6191 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937); see Note (1938) 26 Georgetown Law J.
489.
62 26 U. S. C. A. secs. 1152-a, 1162, 1184, 1185.
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the laudable motives of many courts which prefer to let an offender
go unpunished rather than countenance questionable methods in
his apprehension or prosecution, the traditional sporting theory of
justice in the criminal law still boasts many ardent supporters.
In Nardone v. United States3 the defendant, who was con-
victed of smuggling alcohol, was granted a certiorari on the ground
that the admission of evidence of federal agents secured by wire
tapping of interstate messages was forbidden by Section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act,04 which provides: ". . . and no
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communica-
tion to any person." The Supreme Court reversed the judgment.
The statute applies to federal officers, and testimony as to the inter-
cepted messages is inadmissible. 5
Until this decision such evidence had generally been held
admissible.6 The decision, however, will probably not, affect the
holdings in the state courts to any great extent, since in a number
of states which have statutes similar to that of Section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act, they have held contrary- to the
Nardone decision.6 7  Already the lower federal courts, as demon-
strated by Valli v. United States8 have begun to limit the Nardone
decision by holding that it applies only to interstate messages. 9
03 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1938). See Note (1938) 24 Val. L. Rev. 451.
04 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. Sec. 605 (Supp. 1937).
65 Dissent by Sutherland, who felt that too great a sacrifice of efficient law
enforcement was made by the decision of the court. In United States v. Plisco,
U. S. Dist., D. C., Feb. 11, 1938, 22 Fed. Supp. 242 (1938), the court refused to
admit evidence of a local telephone conversation in the District of Columbia ob-
tained by wire tapping.
C601nstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928). Here the court held that
such evidence was admissible at common law despite the fact that a state statute
made wire tapping a crime. This was in accord with the view of most American
courts that the admission of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means
of obtaining it. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed., 1923) sec. 2183. The minority view
is expressed in connection with unreasonable searches and seizures in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1895) and in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383
(1914). See also People v. Macklin, 353 Ill. 64, 186 N. E. 531. (1933); People v.
Bendoni, 263 Mich. 295, 248 N. W. 627 (1933).
67 Hall v. State, 208 Ala. 199, 94 So. 59 (1922). State v. Rusch, 20 Minn. 158,
275 N. W. 620 (1937). Where, however, the statute expressly provides for the
exclusion of such evidence, courts will exclude it. Ramirez v. State, 123 Tex. Cr.
App. 254, 58 S. W. (2d) 829 (1933).
68 94 F. (2d) 687 (1938). See also United States v. Bianco, U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D.
Mo., Jan. 13, 1938.
09 See Smith et al v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 556 (1937) decided about eight
months before the Nardone case, where the court held that evidence secured by
wire tapping was admissible under the Federal Communications Act of 1934 on
authority of the case of Olmstead v. United State, supra, note 56. It does not
appear whethier the message objected to was interstate or not. See United States
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The courts are still somewhat troubled as to the extent to
which they can go in admitting evidence of a collateral crime com-
mitted by the defendant to prove the offense charged. The general
rule is that a particular crime cannot be proved by evidence of a
distinct, substantive, unrelated collateral offense unless it will tend
to prove guilty knowledge, intent, identity, motive, plan, design,
or, finally, unless it is part of the res gestae of the principal offense. 0
Two cases dealing with this problem are of interest because of
their departure from the rule, one in the direction of liberality and
the other in the direction of narrow conservatism.
In State v. Flowers1 the defendant was indicted, together with
the state's witness, for a conspiracy to rob by means of assault
with firearms or other dangerous weapons, and for robbery in
pursuance of the conspiracy. As proof of the conspiracy, the
trial court admitted in evidence proof that a week after the alleged
robbery the defendant and the state's witness conspired to burn
and in fact did burn an automobile for the purpose of defrauding
an insurance company. This evidence was admitted to show identity
and guilty knowledge. The judgment was affirmed by the appellate
court. This case hardly fits any of the recognized exceptions to
the rule of non-admissibility of evidence of collateral offenses.
7 2
In People v. Montana,7 3 the defendant was indicted for' the
crime of knowingly receiving money for procuring and placing a
particular woman in the custody of another for immoral purposes.
At the trial the court permitted the introduction of evidence show-
ing that on previous occasions the defendant had placed girls in
houses of prostitution and had taken money from them. The judg-
ment was reversed- by the appellate court on the ground that
evidence of the prior crimes was inadmissible. The evidence prob-
ably should have been admitted for the purpose of showing intent
or a common plan by the defendant, since the statute requires intent
to do the forbidden act.75 The established federal rule in cases of
v. Bonanzi, 94 F. <2d) 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) which held that the burden was on
the government agents to prove that the wire-tapped evidence introduced against
the defendant was acquired by the tapping of intra-state wires.
70 People v. Molineaux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901); 1 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed. 1923) secs. 300-306.
71211 N. C. 721, 192 S. E. 110 (1937).
72 See Note (1937) 16 N. C. L. Rev. 24 for a criticism of the case. See State
v. Albert, ... Ore ... , 82 P. (2d) 689 (1938).
73 252 App. Div. 109, 297 N. Y. Supp. 801 (1937).
.4 Two judges dissented from the decision.
75 See Note (1938) 7 Fordham L. Rev. 113 criticizing the decision. See People
v. Molineaux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193 (1901).
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indictment for importing women for the purpose of prostitution is
contrary to the Montana case.
7 6
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIINAL JUSTICE
The attitude of the public towards crime is accurately reflected
by its lack of cooperation with law enforcement agencies. Its
cynical attitude towards the methods and the personnel operating
the machinery of criminal justice, whether justified or not, is a
highly important obstacle that must be overcome before a smooth,
efficient administration is possible. Many measures have been taken
to improve the personnel and methods of police and prosecution
and there has been a corresponding rise in the respect of the
public for those particular agencies.77 In addition to the increasing
complication of crimes and the better organization of criminals, the
difficulties of administration have been augmented by the great
increase in the number of petty criminal cases without a propor-
tionate growth in the numbers of judges and other administrative
officials to handle them.
7 8
A. Personnel of Court
(a) Jury
The declining use of both the grand jury and petit jury is
undoubtedly the result of their being so cumbersome, uncertain,
and expensive. There are many instances where the accused does
not claim a right to a jury trial but rather contends that he is
entitled to a trial without a jury. 9 In the case of District of Columbia
v. Clawans8" the old problem of the right of trial by jury was
involved. The defendant was engaged in the business of dealer in
return portions of railway tickets in violation of an act of Congress
76 Kinser v. United States, 231 Fed. 856 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). See 17 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 720. See Note (1938) 7 Fordham L. Rev. 113.
77 J. B. Waite, Note (1938) 37 Mich. L. Rev. "113, states that the dismissal of
the prosecution because of reference to other crimes of the defendant in the
case of People v. Hines, N. Y. Sup. Ct., Sept. 12, 1938, did much to return the
administration of criminal justice into public disrepute from which it has been
struggling *since the turn of the century.
78 Warner, op. cit. at 590.
79 See Oppenheim, Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases (1926) 25 Mich:
L. Rev. 695-739; Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases (1931) 20 Calif. L.
Rev. 132-161. In United States v. Dubrin, 93 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) the
Circuit Court held that trial court could not permit the defendant to waive trial
by jury unless the prosecution consented. See Note (1938) 26 Georgetown L. J.
762.
8057 Sup. Ct. 660 (1937).
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requiring a license. The maximum penalty for violation of the
regulation was a three hundred dollar fine or ninety days in jail.
Over his objection the defenant was tried without a jury. The
court, applying the test of severity of punishment, held that this
was a petty offense in which the defendant was not entitled to a
jury trial." The court reasoned that the moral quality of the crime
was relatively inoffensive since it was a mere infringement of a
local police regulation which was not punishable at common law.
In the case of People v. Boyle8 2 an effort was made to define
more clearly the vague, general principles governing interrogatories
on voir dire examinations. The accused, members of a striking
labor union, convicted of burglary, appealed on the ground of
prejudicial conduct on the part of the prosecution in asking pros-
pective jurors if they were communists, thereby insinuating that
the defendants were communists. The appellate court held that
the interrogation was proper in view of the well known tenets of
communists in regard to labor problems. This case presents a
difficulty similar to the one arising in personal injury cases where
counsel desires to question prospective jurors on their connection
with insurance companies.83 The only generalization which can be
derived from a study of these cases is that the circumstances of
each individual case will govern the scope of permissible interroga-
tion and that the trial judge possesseg the right to determine
whether a particular question will aid in selecting an impartial
jury. The trial judge's discretion in this regard will be reversed
only when he permits questions clearly irrelevant to that purpose
and prejudicial to one of the parties.
(b) Prosecutors
The decline of the grand jury84 and rapidly expanding use of
the information 2 has so increased the power of the prosecuting
8 l Dissent by Butler on the ground that the punishment was sufficiently severe
to warrant a trial by jury.
See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63 (1930), where the court held
that defendant was entitled to a jury in a trial for reckless driving; criticized
in Note (1930) 40 Yale L. J. 1303-9.
For a complete discussion of trial by jury in petty offenses see Frankfurter
and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by
Jury (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917.
82 90 Cal. App. Dec. 323, 70 P. (2d) 955. See Note (1937) 26 Calif. L. Rev. 153.
83 See Note (1936) 10 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 315; Note (1936) 35 Mich. L. Rev.
338.
84 See Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (1931) 10 Ore. L. Rev. 101;
Miller, Information or Indictments in Felony Cases (1924) 8 Minn. L. Rev. 379.
86 Moley, Politics and Criminal Prosecution, 127-148 (1929). See Dession. From
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attorney that he is now clearly the most important link in the
chain of administrative officials in the enforcement of the criminal
law. While a judge exercises his authority in public, the prosecutor
employs a great measure of his enormous power as, for example, in
connection with nolle pros, in his own office in accordance with the
standard of his own ability and honesty."6
The tremendous pressure of business upon the under-staffed
office of the prosecuting attorney has necessitated the time-saving
device of bargaining with defendants and compromising on lesser
degrees of the crime originally charged. To those who decry this
practice8 7 the case of People v. Boyle-s will sound an encouraging
note. The defendant was convicted, after trial by jury, of robbery
in the first degree and appealed from the judgment and order
denying his motion for a new trial. Prior to the trial the defendant
agreed with the district attorney that he would turn state's witness
in return for permission to plead guilty to second degree robbery,
if it was agreeable to the court. The jury was impaneled and sworn
and the defendant, assuming there would be no objection to his
plea by the court, did not challenge the jurors. The court then
refused to allow the defendant to plead guilty to second degree
robbery. The appellate court affirmed the judgment. The court
reasoned that although a defendant may waive his right to question
prospective jurors and to exercise the peremptory challenges al-
lowed him by law, merely because he has done so under an errone-
ous assumption that he will be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser
degree of the offense charged does not deprive him of that right
since he knows that acceptance of the plea rests in the discretion
of the court."9
Indictment to Information (1932) 42 Yale L. J. 163, for a defense of grand jury
system.
86 Warner, op. cit. at 597-8.
87 Moley, The Prosecutor and the Plea of Guilty (1928) 53 Reports of the
American Bar Association 541-555. See also Miller (1937) The Compromise of
Criminal Cases; American Law Institute (1934), A Study of the Business of the
Federal Courts, Part I, p. 12.
8822 Calif. App. (2d) 589, 71 P. (2d) 945 (1937).
89In State v. Cooper, 366 111. 113, 7 N. E. (2d) 882 (1937) 110 A. L. R. 223, it
was held that the failure of the trial court to make the explanation required
by a mandatory statute providing that a plea of guilty shall not be entered
until the court has fully explained to the accused the consequences of entering
such a plea is ground for reversal. See United States v. Denniston, 89 F. (2d)
696 (1937) where the court held that a defendant who pleaded guilty with an
understanding of its consequences could not withdraw such plea as a matter
of right but only within the discretion of the court.
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B. Methods of Proof
(a) New Mechanical Devices
Even the most caustic critic of modern criminal law enforce-
ment is willing to concede that there has been improvement in
police and prosecution methods in the last few decades. The
trend has been towards specialization of services in such fields as
ballistics, chemistry, handwriting, and fingerprinting. In many
instances police departments have established schools, raised edu-
cational standards and improved generally the esprit de corps of
the personnel in various ways. The establishment of accurate and
complete record systems has displaced the slipshod methods previ-
ously existing in many agencies concerned with law enforcement.
The utilization of new inventions by the prosecutor such as the lie
detector, usually by agreement with the accused, is becoming more
frequentY' In People v. Hayes9 1 a seldom-used method of proving
the defendant's confession to a charge of manslaughter was approved
by the court. It permitted a sound picture of the defendant making
a voluntary confession to be reproduced before the jury and to be
received as sole evidence of the confession after proof of its authen-
ticity and accuracy was established. 92 While the use of this device
may not absolutely eliminate the possibility of introduction of il-
legally obtained confessions it appears to be a step in that direction
since the appearance, attitude, and voice of the accused can be
studied by the court or jury.
(b) Presumptions
The facilitation of proving the offense by the creation of pre-
sumptions of guilt and the shifting of the burden of proof has led
to their wholesale adoption in many states.93 An instance of this
type of procedural aid was involved in People v. Kiser, where
the court held that in the commission of a felony by two or more
persons the possession and use of a gun by one of such persons
90In State v. Duguid, Ariz., 72 P. (2d) 435 (1937) where the defendant
voluntarily gave the doctor a urine sample even though he was ignorant of the
purpose for which it was requested, the court held that the doctor's report on
the urine analysis was admissible in a prosecution for driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.
91 21 Calif. App. (2d) 320, 71 P. (2d) 321 (1937).
92 See Note (1938) 12 Tulane L, Rev. 304. See Commonwealth v. Roller, 100
Pa. Sup. Ct, 125, 13 Pa. Dist. C. 332 (1930).
9 3 Supra note 4.
94 22 Calif. App. (2d) 435, 71 P. (2d) 98 (1937).
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constitutes possession and use of the weapon by each of the others."
Such presumptions are of value in the effort to obviate crude
illegal methods of obtaining evidence and the resort to brutal third
degrees. Our presumption of innocence, however, is a substantial
right which should not lightly be disturbed, nor should it be
abused by an excessive resort to contrary presumptions.
In People ex rel Dixon v. Lewis6 the court felt that the pre-
Sumption exceeded the constitutional bounds of due process. It
declared invalid the statute providing that "the presence in an
automobile of a pistol shall be presumptive evidence of its illegal
possession by all persons found in such automobile at the time it
is found" on the ground that it was placing the burden of proving
his innocence on the defendant contrary to constitutional due
process clause. The court said:
"It seems self-evident that the legislature has not the power to
declare that certain facts shall be sufficient to prove the thing sought
to be established when it is apparent that such facts do not in reason
and logic possess such inherent probative force and value; otherwise the
legislature might by legislative fiat create a presumption which would
permit the guilt of the defendant to be declared without actual proof
thereof. There must be a rational connection between the facts proven
and the ultimate fact sought to be established."
This case followed the old federal rule which, however, has
since been placed upon a broader footing. The present rule is
that a presumption or shift of burden of proof is valid if it is
justified by the "sinister significance" of the fact proved, or by a
"manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for
knowledge" which would render the imposition of such a burden
on the defendant no "hardship or oppression.""7 Applying this later
test it seems that the New York court was somewhat strict in its
view of the case.
In People v. Carmen 8 the Illinois Supreme Court narrowed
the protection afforded a defendant by a statute"' which provided
inter alia that a defendant's failure to testify should not create a
05 See People v. Panitz, 296 N. Y. Supp. 80 (1937), where court upheld the
Penal Law, Sec. 1898, which provided that the possession of weapons specified
in Sec. 1897 constituted presumptive evidence of intent to use unlawfully. Dore,
J., dissenting.
90 293 N. Y. Supp. 191 (1937).
97 Hall, op. cit. at 650; Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 (1934); See Morgan,
Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon Presumptions Created by State Legisla-
tion (1934) Harvard Legal Essays 323, 351.
9 367 Ill. 326, 11 N. E. (2d) 397 (1937).
99 Ill Rev. Stats. c. 38, sec. 734.
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presumption against him. In affirming the conviction of the trial
court the appellate court said, "None of the defendants took the
stand to explain these extravagant representations or any of the
circumstances testified to by the state's witnesses and we think
the jury were fully warranted in the absence of any countervailing
proof or explanation, in believing that the representations were
false. In affirming the decision of the Appellate court the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the statutory prohibition forbidding crea-
tion of a presumption from a defendant's failure to testify did not
prevent a court of review from taking notice of that fact.'
(c) Licenses
The case of Sonzinsky v. United States"' furnishes evidence of
two important trends in present day administration of criminal
justice. The defendant was convicted of violating the federal
statute' by a failure to pay a two hundred dollar annual license
tax imposed on dealers handling certain types of firearms, such as
sawed-off shotguns and sub-machine guns. A violation of the act
was punishable by a maximum penalty of a two thousand dollar
fine or imprisonment for five years or both. The court held that
this constituted a valid exercise of the taxing power. 0 3 The first
trend which this case illustrates is the utilization of license statutes
to supplement the criminal law. The number of cases which formerly
were handled by the criminal courts but are now being handled
administratively by revogation of license is rapidly expanding.
During the last few generations the growth of the number of
occupational licenses has been tremendous and the automobile era
has witnessed the extension of this device in the effort to regulate
motorist.'14 The hearings at which licenses are revoked fre-
100 But see In re Opinion of the Justice, Mass., 15 N. E. (2d) 662 (1938)
where the court held in an advisory opinion that a proposed bill which would
prohibit comment by counsel but would permit the judge to instruct the jury
that it could consider the defendant's silence if the judge was satisfied that the
defendant could contradict material testimony was unconstitutional because it
would compel the defendant to testify against himself. Criticized in Note (1938)
87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 122.
101 57 Sup. Ct. 554 (1937).
102 48 Stat. 1237 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1132a (1935).
103 In spite of the fact that the statute was obviously passed for the purpose
of regulating the sale of firearms just as the Harrison Narcotic Act was for
the purpose of regulating drugs, the court declared that this was a valid exercise
of the taxing power and that it would not look beyond the face of the statute
to condemn it as a regulation of matters beyond the power of Congress. See
United-States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919); McCray v. United States, 195 U. S.
27 (1904), 24 S. Ct. 769.
104 E. g., N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law (1933) sec. 71.
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quently afford very few of the safeguards available to the defendant
in a criminal case. Formal accusation is unnecessary: the rules
of evidence do not apply: there is no jury: and if an appeal is
allowed, it is often to an administrative body. The criminal law
operates indirectly in cases of revoked licenses since, if the offender
performs a function without the requisite license the sanctions of
the criminal law are invoked to punish him. It is obvious that for
'certain purposes the employment of a revocable license is prefer-
able to the criminal prosecution. The extent to which this alterna-
tive method will displace the criminal law in controlling conduct
depends upon the ability of courts to cope with new problems. 105
The second current trend illustrated by the Sonzinsky case
is the expansion of the activities of the federal government into the
field of crime repression heretofore handled solely by local agencies.
Recent years have witnessed the steady increase of statutes giving
the federal government jurisdiction on the basis of its power to
regulate interstate commerce, or its power to tax.0
(d) Appeal by the State
The practice of reversals for technical errors in the admission
or exclusion of evidence has become less frequent in recent times.
The possibility of- a reversal, however, is a disturbing thought in
the mind of the trial judge and frequently influences him to admit
almost any evidence offered by the defendant and to exclude
much evidence offered by the prosecution because only the de-
fence has a broad right of appeal. To remedy this it has been
suggested that the scope of the state's right of appeal be increased. 07
There have been instances of statutes'018 giving the state broad
powers of appeal and they had been upheld by their appel-
late courts. 10 9 In Palko v. State of Connecticut'" the Supreriie
17 Court of the United States finally ruled on the validity of the
Connecticut Statute"' adopted in 1886. The accused was originally
tried for first degree homicide and the jury found him guilty of
105 Warner, op. cit. at 611-13.
106 For example, the Lindbergh Law, 18 U. S. C. sec. 408a (1934); Mann Act,
18 U. S. C. seas. 397-404 (1934); Dyer Act (interstate transportation of stolen
goods); 18 U. S. C. secs. 413-19 (1934); Harrison Narcotic Act, 26 U. S. C. sec. 1040
(1934).
207 Warner, op. cit. at 589; see Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases
(1927) 36 Yale L. J. 486.
108 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930). sec. 6494; Vt. Public Laws (1933) sec. 6494.
109 State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 AUt. 1110 (1894); State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105
AtL. 23 (1918); See Note (1919) 28 Yale L. . 408.
110 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937), Justice Butler dissenting.
11 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) sec. 6494.
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the offense in the second degree. The state, pursuant to the
statute, appealed for errors of law committed by the trial judge.
The Supreme Court of Errors ordered a new trial on the ground
thai there had been error of law prejudicial to the state in the
exclusion of certain testimony and in the court's instructions to
the jury. Upon retrial the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. Upon the appeal to the United States Supreme Court the
defendant contended that the new trial placed him in second
jeopardy for the same offense contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In deciding the issue the court had the option of upholding
it upon either of two theories. It might have viewed the original
trial, reversal, and retrial as a single proceeding and thus obviated
all question of double jeopardy. Although there is no logical
objection to this argument,112 the court preferred to base its decision
on another ground, namely, that the procedure under the statute
was not such an unreasonable deprivation of the rights of the
accused as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Palko case
does not warrant the conclusion that a state may in every case
eliminate the defense of double jeopardy, but only that the state
is entitled, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to a reciprocal priv-
ilege of appeal for errors of law. It is apparent that the double
jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment, as it has been con-
strued by the Supreme Court113 operates as a stricter limitation
upon the Federal Government than does the "due process clause"
in analogous situations upon the states.14
CONCLUSION
Two important subjects which, however, are outside the scope
of this article are the problem of treatment of the convicted offender
and the application of prophylactic measures in the prevention of
crime. Several intensive studies, 115 landmarks in the field of sci-
entific inventory of criminal law processes, have demonstrated the
utter failure of our traditional, methods of treating convicted of-
fenders. Indeed, even such theoretically sound and scientifically
approved instruments as parole and probation have proved unsatis-
factory because of unwise application and faulty implementation.
112 Note (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 491, 492. In Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100
(1904) a similar trial was recognized as a separate proceeding.
"3 United States v. Kepner, 193 U. S. 100 (1904).
-Note (1938) 26 Georgetown L. J. 439, 451.
15E. g., Glueck, S. and E. T. Five Hundred Delinquent Women (1934); 500
Ciminal Careers (1930); One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents (1934).
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A survey of the cases in this article justifies the conclusion
that although there have been some deviations from the traditional
principles of the criminal law, no substantial progress has been
made. In the evolution of the criminal law the reforms, either by
legislation or case law, have been so sporadic and motivated by
so many varying desires that finally it has the pattern of a crazy
quilt, a combination of inconsistent compromises and contradictory
'theories. Before we can achieve a criminal code based upon some
fundamental underlying theory which will guide, correlate, and
integrate the actions and efforts of all the law enforcement agencies,
there must be a thorough examination and restatement of the
criminal law.1'0
116 Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 453;
Gausewitz, Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code (1936) 11 Wis. L. Rev. 346.
See Report of Advisory Committee of the American Institute on Criminal Justice
(Jan. 30, 1935) 20-21.
